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ABSTRACT
Gangs have long been a feature of the social landscape of the City of Cape 
Town and its environment. They have endured the heaves and sighs of change 
which have accompanied South Africa’s social and political transformation. 
Whilst local scholarship on gangs is well-established, the complex dynamics 
accompanying the actual policing of gangs have received relatively little atten-
tion. By drawing on a series of in-depth interviews with members of the police 
organisation and on a small sample of interviews with gang leaders, this article 
begins to explore selected aspects of the policies and practices associated with 
the policing of gangs in Cape Town. Central to this exploration is the argu-
ment that a wide range of factors influences the operational strategies vis-à-vis 
gangs including that of the institutional culture of the police itself.
1.  Introduction
The methods used in the policing of gangs are complex and ill-
understood. Many factors influence the way gangs are policed. Such 
factors include the nature and levels of violent conflict associated with 
gangs; the nature of the relationship between gangs and communities; 
the operational capacity and the amount of resources at the disposal 
of the police, and the way in which police understand gangs. The 
relationship between gangs and the communities in which they live 
is characterised by symbiotic co-existence. There is much ambiguity 
in this co-existence. On the one hand, gangs provide livelihoods and 
security to communities. On the other hand they act in ways which 
are detrimental to community security and well-being. Gang violence 
tends to disorganise communities and makes for division between 
neighbours and within families and communities. Attempts to arrest 
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and prosecute gang leaders who have cultivated community support 
may provoke resistance and thus fuel conflicts within communities.
Inextricably linked to the manner in which gangs are policed is the 
way the police view their jobs more generally, and how they view 
gangs more specifically. Police officers see themselves as better than the 
people they are supposed to be policing2 and this contributes to their 
world view of criminals, including gangsters. Police culture3 is a factor 
which shapes the operational responses of the police to a wide variety 
of situations and target groups such as gangs. This article makes some 
attempt at exploring the importance of police culture on the policing 
of gangs. How indeed do the definitions and social constructions of 
gangs on the part of the police influence the very policing of gangs?
2.  A brief note on methodology
This discussion forms part of doctoral research which I have been 
conducting over the past year with the view to exploring the political, 
social and organisational dynamics underlying the policing of gangs. 
In total twenty people were interviewed over a twelve month period 
(March 2008 to February 2009). Interviewees included four gang 
leaders and fourteen police officials, two community anti-crime activ-
ists, one member of the Department of Correctional Services and one 
former MEC for Safety and Security. The face-to-face interviews lasted 
on average one hour. The interviews focused on a number of themes 
of relevance to the topic. A key focus within the interviews was the 
policing of gangs during the period 1996-2002 when conflict between 
an anti-crime vigilante organisation (People Against Gangsterism and 
Drugs, hereafter referred to as PAGAD) and gangs raged in the Western 
Cape.
In the discussion below, international literature relevant to the 
topic of police and gangs is introduced, before turning to a brief 
discussion of South African literature. These introductory sections 
are meant to provide a context for themes which emerged from the 
interviews and which cast some light onto the factors influencing 
the policing of gangs as identified by the police officers who were 
interviewed. Further research is of course required to explore in 
more substance and far greater detail the issues identified in this 
exploratory enquiry.
2 This is a comment attributed to a policeman elsewhere in this monograph.
3 The police officers interviewed comprised of two former and one current deputy 
provincial police commissioners, two former provincial commissioners, one assistant 
and one divisional commissioner, two police directors, one police operational plan-
ner, one counter terrorist captain and a station commissioner.
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3.  Criminological literature on gangs and the policing 
thereof
The criminological literature on gangs is well developed. Fredrick 
Thrasher’s seminal work of 19294 has long informed our understand-
ing of the structure and function of gangs. Seventy years later, a lot has 
changed in terms of gang structures and gang operations. The level of 
street organisation exhibited by gangs in the latter part of the twentieth 
century has changed dramatically. Compared to the gangs studied by 
Thrasher, gangs have developed a more structured and organised ap-
proach to criminality.
From a policing point of view, the successful investigation of gang 
crimes confronts many obstacles. American studies confirm that a 
common recourse amongst law enforcement agencies is the establish-
ment of specialised gang units which take responsibility for the polic-
ing of gangs. The justification for such specialisation is that there is a 
level of complexity involved in the policing of gangs that police would 
not encounter in their dealing with ‘ordinary criminals’. Such complex-
ity includes the fact that communities where gangs reside often protect 
them despite the fact that gangs enforce their rules on the community 
through fear and coercion. American developments suggest that police 
organisations tend to deploy a huge amount of resources in the polic-
ing of gangs. So, for example, extensive use is made of surveillance and 
of search and seizure operations. It is a moot point however whether 
such policing strategies make inroads into the power and control of 
gangs within communities. According to Katz and Webb,5 police gang 
units have only been partly effective. Others concur that the outcomes 
of such strategies do not justify the amount of resources ploughed into 
the effort. Green and Pranis argue that intensive police enforcement 
tactics in Los Angeles have increased social solidarity amongst gang 
members and strengthened rather than reduced the power of gangs.6 
As they put it:
‘Los Angeles taxpayers have not seen a return on their massive investments 
over the past quarter century: Law enforcement agencies report that there 
are now six times as many gangs and at least double the number of gang 
members in the region. In the undisputed gang capital of the U.S., more 
police, more prisons haven’t stopped the cycle of gang violence. Los Angeles 
is losing the war on gangs.’7
4 F Thrasher The Gang: A Study of 1313 (1929).
5 CM Katz, J Vincent Policing gangs in America, (2006)
6 J Greene and K Pranis ‘Gang wars: The failure of enforcement tactics and the need for 
effective public strategies’ (2007) Justice Policy Institute.
7 Ibid.
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Furthermore Albert Meeham8 reminds us that the ways in which 
gangs are policed are very much influenced by constructions of the 
gang problem amongst politicians and the media. Lastly, the extent to 
which real and perceived collusion between police and gangs bedevil 
law enforcement approaches is an issue widely acknowledged in the 
literature.9
South African literature on gangs deserves some mention. Most of 
the early literature on the topic focused on the history and develop-
ment of prison gangs in the country.10 It was not until the early 1980s 
that street gangs became the focus of research. Here the contributions 
of scholars such as Don Pinnock and Wilfried Schärf have been par-
ticularly influential.11 Both authors approached gangs from a structural 
angle. Gang formation they argued had to be understood within the 
political and economic context of Apartheid and its consequent dislo-
cation of families and communities. Looking beyond the Western Cape, 
historical enquiries conducted by historians in the northern part of 
the country have focused on the gang formations in urban areas of 
African settlement — particularly within the industrial heart of the 
country. In this regard the work of van Onselen and Glaser is particu-
larly important.12
After 1994, in the context of democratisation, changes in the social or-
ganisation of gangs became a focus of research as street gangs adapted 
to the global imperatives of organised crime.13 New criminal opportuni-
ties have arisen in the light of the new democratic state’s inability to 
8 A Meeham ‘The organizational career of gang statistics: The politics of policing gangs’ 
2000 41 (3) The Sociological Quarterly 337.
9 S Venkatesh Gang Leader for a Day: A Rogue Sociologist Crosses the Line (2008) 239.
10 N Haysom ‘Towards an understanding of prison gangs’ (1981) Institute of Crimino-
logy University of Cape Town. Also see C Van Onselen Crime and total institutions 
in the making of modern South Africa (1982); JM Lotter and WJ Schurink Gevange-
nisbendes: ’n ondersoek met spesiale verwysing na nommerbendes onder kleurlingge-
vangenes. (1984).
11 D Pinnock The Brotherhoods: Street gangs and state control in Cape Town (1984); 
D Pinnock and D Douglas-Hamilton Gangs, Ritual and Rites of Passage (1997); W 
Schärf ‘Bombs, bungles and police transformation: When is the SAPS going to get 
smarter?’ in J Steinberg Crime Wave: The South African Underworld and its Foes 
(2001); W Schärf ‘Street gangs, survival and political consciousness in the eighties’ 
(1986) an unpublished paper; W Schärf ‘The resurgence of urban street gangs and 
community response in Cape Town during the late eighties’ in D Hansson and Dirk 
van Zyl Smit (eds) Towards Justice? Crime and state control in South Africa (1990).
12 C Van Onselen Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 
(1886-1914) (1982); C Glaser Bo-tsotsi: The Youth Gangs Of Soweto, 1935-1976 
(2000).
13 I Kinnes ‘From street gangs to criminal empires: The changing face of gangs in the 
Western Cape’ (2000) ISS Monograph Series No 48; A Standing, ‘The social contradic-
tions of organised crime on the Cape Flats’ (2003) ISS Occasional Paper 74 and A 
Standing Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2006).
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manage its own borders. International drug and crime syndicates have 
capitalised on this weakness and local gangs have become inserted into 
international crime networks. The degree of organisation exhibited by 
street gangs in the Western Cape has emerged as a point of debate in 
the literature. On the one hand, Kinnes states that after the transition to 
democracy, gangs such as the Hard Livings and the Americans become 
more organised.14 Whilst on the other hand, Standing questions the level 
of organisation amongst street gangs in the Western Cape.15 However, 
despite the controversy, it would seem clear that those leaders that have 
been at the core of gang structures are much closer to organised crime 
networks than is the case with the rank and file.
For those interested in the topic of law enforcement and gangs, the 
period 1996 to 1999 is particularly significant, as it confronted the 
police with a hitherto unknown form of criminal activity on the Cape 
Flats. The challenge came from an emerging anti-crime organisation. In 
the early years of its existence, PAGAD projected itself as an anti-crime 
movement concerned primarily about the ravages of the drug economy 
in coloured communities. Time and again, PAGAD supporters marched 
on the homes of drug dealers in a number of residential areas. Over 
time the protest actions spearheaded by PAGAD became more militant 
and then extra-legal. Before long, PAGAD became branded as a ‘vigi-
lante’ organisation.
In August 1996 a meeting called by PAGAD led to a march on the 
house of Rashaad Staggie, the alleged leader of the Hard Livings gang 
in Cape Town. The PAGAD-led march ultimately resulted in the murder 
of Rasheed Staggie. After this event the stage was set for a war between 
the gangs, vigilantes and the police in which many people were to die. 
By the late 1990s, PAGAD was involved in an attack on gangsters and on 
state officials attempting to clamp down on the organisation.16 Actions 
by prominent PAGAD activists soon assumed the form of ‘urban terror’. 
PAGAD’s evolution from an anti-crime body to a vigilante group and then 
to an urban terror organisation was to have an unprecedented impact on 
the way in which the state and its police operated in Cape Town.
For those interested in the policing of gangs, the emergence of PAGAD 
is significant for a number of reasons. The organisation initially united 
sections of the community (largely, but not exclusively, members of the 
14 I Kinnes The Hard Livings: The Impact of political and social transformation to demo-
cracy on the gang in Manenberg (1992-1998) MPhil (LSE) (1999).
15 Standing op cit (n 13) 77; W Dixon and L Johns ‘Gangs PAGAD and the state: Vigilant-
ism and revenge violence in the Western Cape’ (2001) Violence and Transition Series 
Vol.2 CSVR; R Galant and F Gamieldien Drugs, Gangs and People’s Power: Exploring 
the PAGAD Phenomenon (1996).
16 See I Kinnes op cit (n 13), W Schärf, ‘Organised Crime comes of Age: During Tran-
sition to Democracy’ in Rashied Galant and Fahmi Gamieldien (eds) Drugs, Gangs, 
People’s Power: Exploring the PAGAD Phenomenon (1996).
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Muslim community) through challenging the power and control of the 
gangs. More importantly, the organisation challenged the traditional 
methods and practices of the police regarding gangs and gang violence. 
PAGAD also succeeded in putting the issue of police corruption and 
police complicity with gangs squarely in the public domain. The evolu-
tion of PAGAD from anti-crime to vigilante formation meant that before 
long the police ended up policing PAGAD rather than the gangs. This 
shifting of policing priorities and the redirection of resources meant 
that gangs were no longer the central focus of police attention and 
could thus utilise the space for pursuing their business interests.
From the interviews with police officers it became clear that a fair 
measure of confusion accompanied the emergence of PAGAD. As one 
of the provincial police commissioners involved noted:
‘So therefore when PAGAD started which was also against gangsterism and 
drugs, at the beginning I thought that this was a community based organisa-
tion and it could be of great assistance to the police in curbing the violence. I 
thought in my first six months as provincial commissioner, we’re on our way 
to get a good solid base to work against gangsterism involving PAGAD. But 
unfortunately as the organisation evolved PAGAD became a bigger threat to 
the police than the gangs for that matter.’17
Various studies18 have commented on the inability of the police to 
effectively manage investigations and prosecution of gangs and gang-
related crime. The policing of gangs had been led by specialised police 
units and prosecutors investigating violent crimes associated with gang 
members. By the late 1990s the gangs came to be policed in terms of 
the provisions outlined in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121of 
1998. This legal tool turned out to be of dubious reliability. In order for 
the police to get convictions they needed to prove gang membership, 
in addition, the police were able to label the criminal acts by members 
of PAGAD’s ‘G-force’ as ‘urban terrorism’, which while valid in a sense 
further alienated key PAGAD members.
4.  Locating the gangs of Cape Town
The violence associated with the gangs of Cape Town is well known. 
Such violence permeates the streets, townships and suburbs of the city 
and affects the lives of people who live there through a range of crimi-
nal activities. Armed robbery, rape, organised murder and especially 
extortion play an important role in how some of the smaller gangs 
such as the Sexy Boys, Mongrels, Nice Time Kids and the Junior Cisko 
Yakkies amongst others survive on the streets of the city. One signifi-
17 From interview with Police Commissioner C.
18 Kinnes op cit (n 13); Schärf op cit (n 11).
An exploration of the dynamics shaping the policing of gangs 
in Cape Town 181
cant activity remains the distribution and sale of drugs on the Cape 
Flats, with many of these smaller gangs involved in pushing drugs for 
bigger gangs.
The Hard Livings, Sexy Boys and Americans are particularly well 
known for their use of violence to achieve their ends. They have the 
potential to disrupt essential government services in communities when 
they are involved in fighting. One illustration is the Hanover Park com-
munity. In late 2006 there was an outbreak of a gang war between the 
Talibans and the Americans in Hanover Park. Drive-by-shootings on 
the part of gangs became relatively common, and community disrup-
tion frequent. In violence affected areas, local clinics were forced to 
close, schooling was disrupted and public transport affected. It took 
the police the better part of six months to bring the violence under 
control. They could only do so after the community police forum and 
the neighbourhood watches became involved in attempts to restore a 
semblance of peace in these areas.
5.  Anti-gang police operations
From 1994 to 2006 the police launched many operations against 
gangs. Henri Boshoff has provided us with a convenient timeline for 
police operations in his analysis of urban terrorism19 in South Africa. It 
shows that SAPS launched many operations against crime and terror-
ism. During February 1998 in a briefing by the Provincial Operational 
Coordinating Committee, to the Standing Committee on Safety and 
Security in the National Assembly, the police revealed their objectives 
for ‘Operation Recoil’:
‘Operation Recoil was launched on 23 October 1997 mainly to counter the 
insecurity among the population influenced by media-driven speculation 
about ‘war’ between gangs and/or PAGAD. The concept of Operation Recoil 
was premised on the principle of flooding flash-point areas with high density 
security deployments by way of mobile visible patrols as well as cordon and 
search operations in order to flush out criminals in such flash-point areas.’20
The police viewed these operations as successful in view of the numbers 
of arrests and the amount of stolen goods and firearms recovered.21 
For instance, ‘Operation Good Hope’ was aimed at reducing gang and 
criminal violence; ‘Operation Crackdown’ was meant to clamp down 
on illegal firearms in circulation; whilst ‘Operation Gang-Bust’ aimed 
19 H Boshoff ‘Fear in the city, urban terrorism in South Africa’ (2001) ISS Monograph 
Series No 63.
20 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Minutes, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/
node/7111, accessed on 23/06/2009.
21 Boshoff goes into great detail in providing some of the statistics related to these 
operations.
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at putting an end to gang wars and clearing the streets of violent gang-
sters. From the interviews conducted it became clear that the police 
themselves seemed to have struggled with distinguishing between 
what constituted ‘urban terror’ and what constituted ‘gang violence’ in 
that turbulent period.
What kind of factors facilitated or sabotaged the state’s response 
(whether proactive or reactive) to gangs in the Western Cape? From 
the interviews with police officials and a few senior gang members, a 
number of factors emerged. The discussion below attempts to organise 
— albeit in broad terms — views from the field relevant to a considera-
tion of the challenges confronting the policing of gangs.
5.1  The absence of reliable information on gangs
One of the challenges which police confront in the policing of gangs 
is the absence of reliable information. There is little in the way of 
agreement on the size of the gang problem in South Africa. The oldest 
estimate of the number of gang members in Cape Town dates back to 
1984. At the time Don Pinnock placed the number of gang members 
in the City at 100 000.22 Sixteen years down the line this figure still 
crops up in research.23 In 2003 Häefele noted that ‘[t]he latest estimate 
is that there are more than 100 000 gang members in approximately 
137 gangs in the Western Cape’.24 Standing placed the number of gangs 
slightly lower, at 130.25 Police estimates fare no better. The analysis 
of Greene and Pranis in Los Angeles, and Lemmer et al26 in Chicago, 
indicates that absence of more reliable estimations of the size of the 
gang problem bedevils police strategies worldwide.
Furthermore, the proportion of violent crime for which gangs are 
responsible is also shrouded in some mystery as there is no facility 
within the SAPS crime capturing system to register crimes committed 
by gangs. The police however have claimed to have implemented a 
‘gang monitoring system’. As part of this system, police station com-
missioners are supposed to keep statistics of the numbers of gangs 
and gang members in their station precinct and report them to the 
crime intelligence component, which is then used to develop strategies 
to deal with gang crime. These profiles and statistics are however not 
made public. To date little is known about the efficacy of police opera-
22 D Pinnock The Brotherhood (1984) 4.
23 I Kinnes op cit (n 13) 12.
24 B Häefele ‘Gangsterism in the Western Cape’ (2003) Criminal Economy, Gangs and 
Child Abuse, Community Safety Monitor Journal 11.
25 Standing op cit (n 13) 38.
26 TJ Lemmer, JB Gad and AJ Lurigio ‘An analysis of police responses to gangs in Chi-
cago’ (2008) Police Practice and Research Journal 417-30.
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tions supposedly informed by the data generated through the gang 
monitoring system.
5.2  The primacy of policing ‘urban terror’
A second challenge that confronts law enforcement is the competing 
demands on the time and energy of police officers. This issue is of 
particular relevance when considering the period under discussion. 
Between 1996 and 2000 in particular the state’s attention shifted away 
from gangs as operational strategies and intelligence capacity became 
preoccupied with the challenge posed by PAGAD. The focus on PAGAD 
drained policing resources that initially were meant for policing gangs. 
A senior police officer tasked with managing one of the massive opera-
tions explained that in designing the anti- terror operations during the 
late 1990s, policing gangs was really an afterthought:
‘We need to be very clear on Good Hope. Good Hope was launched in a 
period where there was urban terror. Good Hope’s main focus was to deal 
with the urban terror and not gang related issues. Surely what we then said 
afterwards was while we were dealing with the urban terror threat, at the 
same time, maybe we should also give attention to the gangs, you know 
because we had so many recruits that came into the Western Cape, maybe 
we should also look at the gang issue.’27
When asked to comment on the police philosophy which informed 
anti-gang operations, interviewees argued that the approach was 
very much one of ‘stabilisation and normalisation’. The approach was 
largely drafted by the Deputy National Commissioner, Andre Pruis.28 
This centred on the idea that that the police could only stabilise the 
situation and that other agencies should step in to normalise com-
munity life through job creation and involving young people in other 
social activities. In their report to the Standing Committee on Safety 
and Security, the police explained the strategy as follows:
‘... certain other strategic decisions were also taken with a view of not only 
to stabilise the situation, but also eventually effectively normalise the situa-
tion in a particular gang-ridden area. After having stabilised the situation in 
an affected township, a concerted effort will be made to normalise the situ-
ation, in a sense that an appointed committee comprising of members of the 
security forces, the Secretariat for Safety and Security, the Departments of 
Justice, Welfare and Correctional Services etcetera will look into the prevail-
ing situation and devise ways and means to find a lasting solution for peace 
and security.’ 29
27 From an interview with Police Commissioner D.
28 This strategy is currently still used by SAPS when planning operations and remains a 
throwback from the old national security management system.
29 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Minutes op cit (n 20).
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In fact, despite the rhetoric, the operations were driven by arrests alone 
as opposed to a sustainable developmental solution to gang violence 
in its own right.
5.3  Competition and distrust within the police organisation
It is not uncommon for the level of coherence and focus within law 
enforcement circles to be challenged by internal competition. During 
the interviews some police interviewees touched on the issue of com-
petition in their explanation as to why so many anti-gang operations, 
for example, were launched in such a short space of time. They sug-
gested that intra-organisational competition arose amongst the several 
units charged with dealing with various categories of crime. A former 
senior counter-terrorist police specialist, for example, indicated that 
the reason that the police could not effectively police the gangs was 
as a result of the failure of the police to have a unified organisational 
approach. The inconsistencies in operational planning were brought to 
light by one interviewee as follows:
‘They don’t even start one after the other. Halfway into the one, another 
emerges...As it unfolds, it becomes evident that the operation will not be 
successful in the substantial sense. It becomes evident to some people who 
then on their own proceed to develop an alternative tactic. So then you find 
suddenly Operation Saladin, so there was no announcement that Operation 
Good Hope was done. It’s a success or failure and now we are moving to 
Saladin. It’s almost like rolling mass action where one thing rolls into the 
other and it’s free flowing.’30
Internal competition within police circles meant a lack of cooperation 
and an unwillingness to share intelligence. Such a failure to cooperate 
is not very different from practices among policing agencies around the 
world, where a lack of cooperation is a common feature. The reason 
for this state of affairs is varied, but it has a lot to do with a competition 
for resources, as indicated by the same police officer:
‘I think there isn’t a culture of cooperation in the police. There is a culture 
of following orders, but simultaneously there is a culture of ownership of 
my little fiefdom. These two things are contradictory and in real life when it 
plays out, this contradiction, sometimes people will follow orders and other 
times they will protect their resources, as they see it.31
The difficulty in getting the police units to work together was a huge 
source of frustration and created serious divisions with respect to 
resources, operations and trust within the SAPS. Several of those in-
terviewed made it clear that it was difficult for them to work together. 
30 From an interview with Police Captain E.
31 Ibid.
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Refusal to share intelligence with one another was a common feature 
which emerged from the interviews. Some argued in much stronger 
terms that units routinely sabotaged each other by refusing to provide 
support during operations and by leaking information about opera-
tions to the press.
5.4  Real cops, plastic cops and Hase
Upon closer scrutiny the lack of cooperation within the South African 
police organisation stems in part from political roots. The context for 
the ad-hoc operations involving gangs and PAGAD relate to the divi-
sions rooted in processes of amalgamation and integration of liberation 
fighters into the post-Apartheid police service. In particular there were 
tensions and divisions between the detective division controlled by the 
former old order elements and the intelligence units which contained 
members of the former liberation elements that merged to form the 
South African Police Service. As one interviewee explained:
‘The Staggie murder had a major detrimental impact in that it caused a major 
rift with crime intelligence and the detectives charged with investigating it...
But the most important thing in being a detective and perhaps that is where 
we are falling short today, is that your matter must be driven for the purposes 
of a prosecution. You must accumulate evidence. It must be evidence driven, 
not intelligence driven…We were not being told the truth by crime intelli-
gence, a lot of animosity was built up.’32
During the integration with the old non-statutory units to form the 
South African Police Service, members of the old non-statutory bodies 
such as Mkhonto we Sizwe were viewed with suspicion by existing 
officers recruited during the apartheid era. In order to develop legiti-
macy, integration involved promoting junior members of the police to 
ensure representivity in the police. As a result of transformation and 
integration processes, lateral entrants were head hunted and appointed 
to the top echelons of the leadership and management corps of the 
new SAPS. However, members of the old police viewed such entrants 
with disdain and did not respect them because they did not undergo 
basic police training. One deputy provincial commissioner confirmed 
how her subordinates viewed her entry into the police hierarchy:
‘You are a cop only if you have gone through the college. You are a plastic 
cop if you have not gone through the college.’33
It was assumed that lateral entrees were not fit to be called policemen. 
In fact, it was part of the police culture to refer to former non-police of-
32 From an interview with Police Commissioner B.
33 Op cit (n 17).
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ficers in the employment of SAPS as hase (‘hares’). A former provincial 
commissioner indicated that there was something called police culture. 
He emphasized what his view of police culture was:
‘Of course, the policeman has a specific outlook on his job, and what he 
thinks should be done in curbing crime. You know we call people who are 
not in the police; we even call them a specific name; if you not a policeman, 
in Afrikaans, jy is ’n haas. I still catch myself saying, “Ek het met die haas 
gepraat”. The police are a group that really think that they are different from 
the rest of the society as far as crime investigation and crime prevention 
is concerned which has a lot of benefits. They have a feeling of belonging 
to each other, protecting each other, standing with each other and fighting 
together.’34
5.5  The importance of uniforms
Police are susceptible to the same pressures and pains that ordinary 
people have to endure. The difference is that police officers wear 
uniforms and uniforms give them authority (perceived and real) over 
those they police. The uniform elevates the position of the bearer in 
society and provides (symbolic) resources to mediate the day-to-day 
problems the police officer encounters along the way. Elsewhere in the 
literature the uniform is recognised as an important cultural symbol 
which allows the police officer to exercise power on the ground.
During the research process, both police and gang-aligned inter-
viewees alike noted that the uniform plays an important role in the 
policing of gangs. According to one interviewee, the uniform created a 
‘superman complex’ in some police officers. A gang leader explained 
how the police officer changes when he puts on a uniform.
‘A policeman, if he puts that uniform on, then he turns into Superman. 
Because now he has power! He treats you like nothing; he treats his own 
community like nothing.’35
Police interviewees agreed that the uniform bestows a certain authority 
on a police officer. In this view the uniform acts as a buffer, a sort of 
insulation against external dangers. A senior police officer command-
ing the gang unit argued:
‘I believe that visibility is one of the cornerstones (of policing) and I believe 
also that the uniform...creates respect. A smart, fit young man in uniform has 
an authority that which a man in jeans and t-shirt does not have. And to take 
our streets back, I believe that you must have authority.’36
34 From an interview with Police Commissioner A.
35 From an interview with Gang Leader C.
36 Op cit (n 32).
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From the above it would follow that a certain loss of power accom-
panies the removal of the uniform. Here the observation of a gang 
member is relevant. The interviewee argued as follows:
‘Then you find the same police officer on weekends, on his off days or on 
holiday without the uniform... The same police officer that was playing the 
role of Superman I get him in a different place with a three quarter pair 
of jeans, a pair of sandals and a sweater and unfortunately I find him in a 
shebeen. I find him drinking there. I see he is not drunk and he is being 
smacked around. He does not have the power to resist.’37
When the gang unit was first established in 1989 the police in the 
unit were in plain clothes. It was only in 1996 when a new command 
took over the management of the unit that officers were required to 
be uniformed. The management equated the wearing of uniforms with 
a more professional stance. This point was made as follows by one 
senior officer:
‘You create professionalism also in the way you dress. Let the people look 
like something. I get worried when I go to the police stations and I look at 
the people and I think this is a bunch of skorrie morries! We are better than 
the people that we are locking up. Therefore, we must look better, we must 
act better and we must speak better.’38
5.6  The instrumentality of violence and a bit of ‘madness’
Prior to 1994, the use of force was a standard feature which accompa-
nied the policing of gangs. The post-1994 dispensation brought with it 
an explicit commitment to human rights. New rules were introduced to 
define operational strategies — including operations involving gangs. 
During one interview a senior police officer who led a gang unit spoke 
about the difficulties of adapting to a change in legal rules and ethos:
‘It’s almost a psychosis of that time that police officers…that we came from a 
culture of policing where it was not offensive and a violation of any human 
right structure for us to engage in violence with our suspects. I still remem-
ber around 1992 or so, we had to sign the Peace Accord where we undertook 
not to use violence. That was a huge orientation process for us as if one day 
you can use violence and the next day you can’t. It was almost an accepted 
method.’39
The use of violence appears to have been common practice in the 
interaction with gangs, as evidenced by the comments by the police. 
At one point, sixteen members of the gang unit were convicted on 
a charge of culpable homicide after beating a gangster to death in 
37 Op cit (n 35).
38 Op cit (n 32).
39 From an interview with Police Superintendent C.
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Hanover Park in 1989. Physical altercations between police and gangs 
were common, as in the use of pickaxe handles (or piksteel). As one 
police officer who managed the gang unit put it:
‘That was one of the standard operating methods, the piksteel.’40
A special kind of police officer was required to police gangs. According 
to one, you needed a police officer with a bit of ‘madness’, a degree of 
fearlessness. As he put it:
‘Two police officers in a police van or even four police officers would not be 
able to stop the Hard Livings and Americans from fighting. You need a hel-
lavu lot more than that. You need police officers that have a bit of madness 
in them.’41
5.7.  Policing gangsters: Policing ‘rubbish’?
Both Manning42 and Ericson43 argue that the social organisation of 
policing is deeply influenced by the culture of the police. In studying 
police patrol work, Ericson suggested that a policeman develops a 
working personality and attitude towards his work, and in the process 
assumed different personalities when dealing with different types of 
criminal offenders and victims.44 It is reasonable to assume that the 
methodology used to police gangsters is greatly influenced by the po-
lice’s organisational culture and by the typification of gang members 
as ‘police property’.45
Reiner argues that ‘police property’:
‘… are low-status, powerless groups whom the dominant majority see as 
problematic or distasteful. The majority are prepared to let the police deal 
with their ‘property’ and turn a blind eye to the manner in which this is 
done. Examples would be vagrants, skid-row alcoholics, the unemployed or 
casually employed residuum, youth adopting a deviant cultural style, ethnic 
minorities, gays, prostitutes and radical organisations.’46
It is of some interest to enquire about the views of those who have 
been at the receiving end of police action against them, in order to 
develop an understanding of what they consider as police culture. 
These people are the gangsters of Cape Town. What may we ask is 
their view of police constructions of gangsters and of police operations 
vis-a-vis gangs? Much more research of course, is required to arrive at a 
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 P K Manning Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing (1997).
43 R V Ericson Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work (1982).
44 Ibid.
45 Manning op cit (n 2).
46 R Reiner The Politics of the Police 2ed (1992) 118.
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more informed understanding of the issues and dynamics involved. The 
small sample of interviews conducted with gang leaders only allows 
for some broad comments. Interviewees spoke of the routine use of 
violence against members of gangs. The adoption of divide and rule 
tactics too were emphasised in police attempts to play off one gang 
against another. One gang leader interviewed on the police’s approach 
to his gang summed up the police’s methods as follows:
‘They were sent in, but did not have the experience of the area. They did 
not have any effect. They have helped to increase the gangs. It’s because the 
police activities had to conform to what the politicians wanted. The politi-
cians have made promises to the people and they could not keep their prom-
ises. This also contributed to gangsterism.’47
Police see and define gangsters as ‘rubbish’.48 Gang members and their 
cases against police officers and other gangsters are not worth inves-
tigating and it appears quite standard to use force when dealing with 
gangsters. The same gang leader recounted how the police dealt with 
his gang when they were fighting with another gang called the Stalag 
17:
‘I was often targeted by the police. I was locked up for many things I did not 
do because I was the leader. I was picked up with a few friends. When we 
got to the police station, they threw us into a cell with our enemies. It was 
the Stalag 17 gang which we were fighting. They were about twenty people 
and we were twelve. We were stabbed.’49
Some gangsters argue that nothing happens to police officers who 
mete out brutality to gangsters. They receive automatic support from 
their colleagues when dealing with gangsters, even if they used illegal 
methods. A conspiracy of silence appears to follow police officers, 
much in the same way gangsters refuse to point out their guilty part-
ners. Police officers stick together against ‘the scum’. They will tend 
to support each other against gangsters much in the same way as 
gangsters will stick together against their rivals and the police. When 
the police in fact refuse to investigate the cases of gangsters because 
they have socially constructed gangsters as ‘rubbish’,50 they are in fact 
creating their own (sub)-culture. This reinforces the view that com-
plaints from gangsters are not worth investigating and are viewed as 
time wasting.
47 From an interview with Gang Leader A.
48 Reiner op cit (n 46) 119.
49 Op cit (n 47).
50 Comment by gangster B of the Mongrels gang on how he thought the police viewed 
them as gangsters.
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‘Look, a gangster’s case is not really accepted. You are rubbish and you 
treated as rubbish. They wanted to kill you.’51
It is at another level that some of the most telling statements of why the 
police treat gangsters, ordinary working class members and other less 
privileged members of society, the way they do. A senior gang leader 
argued that the police are recruiting individuals from the poorer areas 
while his gang was attracting members of the middle or respectable 
classes. According to him, it is the working class people who grew up 
in the same circumstances as the gangsters who mete out the most 
brutality when they encounter or confront gangsters:
‘All the kids from the ghettos are becoming policemen. I see a lot of these 
kids. They drink weekends with the gangsters, they associate with the gang-
sters and on Monday he returns to being a policeman. In addition, his mother 
was a drunkard, his father abused drugs and he was abused very often since 
childhood. He is so traumatised in his childhood days that when he sees you 
as a gangster, then he wants to make his point. He wants to show you that 
he is superior. “You will do as I say”. “Raak Wys” (Become wise)’52
This gang leader suggests that the life stories and inter-generational 
traumas and pains suffered by the parents of the police officers from 
poor areas have a lot to do with their cultural reaction to gangsters, 
including the way force is used. And a former provincial commissioner 
stated that the police are prone to information leaks because:
‘As I was saying, it’s very difficult for a policeman who grew up in the West-
ern Cape; many of his family members are gangsters. His father-in-law for 
that matter might be a gangster.’53
5.8  Taking sides, regulating each other
Police officers are quite often accused of taking sides in the gang wars. 
Such partisanship undoubtedly happens, as has been found in other 
parts of the world. A police officer may take a dislike to specific gangs, 
or manipulate them by favouring one over the other. One reason may 
be the wish to protect certain gang members who provide useful in-
formation and this speaks to the whole issue of police reliance on 
informants who are themselves criminals. It remains one of the most 
intractable problems known in the literature. But also the police officer 
concerned may be on the take from the gang. Corrupt police in cahoots 
with certain gangs, or at least the perception of a corrupt relationship, 
obviously affects views on how effective the police are in dealing with 
51 From an interview with Gang Leader B.
52 Ibid.
53 Op cit (n 34).
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the gang problem54. One gang leader interviewed related an experi-
ence of his with partisan police:
‘The police take sides. One day we came to attack a certain gang. The police 
was in the house which we attacked. When we got there, the police were 
there. They were detectives. They shot back and they hated us. They chose 
sides. We hated them. Everywhere you go, it was like that.’55
There is also the problem of the cultural adoption of gangster language, 
attitudes, symbols and styles among some police officers, leading to a 
perverse and inverted power relationship between the gangs and the 
police. Gangs, for example, do not adopt the cultural and symbolic 
practices of police officers. Police officers making gang hand-signs 
create the recognition of gang power and influence in particular zones. 
The police officer’s bantering approach in speaking sabela (the prison 
gang language of gangsters) is seen as indicative of the way in which 
gang culture permeates police. One gang leader suggested that the 
behaviour of the police ultimately is regulated by the gangs because 
the police adopt their cultures and style:
‘Today the police want to be gangsters. The police want to sabela (speak 
prison gang language), but we don’t want to anymore. I am an ndota and for 
twenty three years of my life I was in the prison gangs and you have not once 
heard me say, ngamphela salute in my speech because I no longer speak that 
way. It’s surprising for me to hear police officers use that language and this 
tells me that they are so institutionalized that where they should regulate the 
gangs; the gangs regulate their behaviour because they adopt practices from 
the gangs but the gangs adopt nothing from them.’56
This is a telling statement by a senior gang leader in Cape Town about 
the manner in which some police officers approach the difficult job of 
dealing with the gang problem.
5.  Conclusion
Although it is generally accepted that gangs are responsible for some 
of the worst crimes against the communities across the Cape Flats, 
very little has been written about the manner in which the police have 
dealt with the gangs. It often appears that the police have been given 
a free hand to work with the gangs in any way they feel fit. However, 
this has had unintended consequences for policing. The police’s social 
construction of gangs and their resulting actions have not created a 
sustainable policing approach to the gangs. In fact, the very behaviour 
of some police officers has helped to develop a culture of policing 
54 S Jensen Gangs, Politics and Dignity in Cape Town (2008) 120.
55 Op cit (n 47).
56 Op cit (n 35).
192 SACJ . (2009) 2
that reinforces the myths and stereotypes regarding gang members, 
which in turn has influenced police institutional culture. Until such 
time that the police recognize their limitations that stem in part from 
their institutional culture, operational planning will seriously suffer 
from tunnel vision.
Simultaneously, gang violence and more recently vigilante violence 
have undermined effective community initiatives to bring about 
a measure of local peace and security. Managing the gang problem 
implies that the police are able to provide fear-ridden communities 
with effective policing that respects the rights of all people they en-
counter, including gangsters. Where there have been genuine attempts 
from the police management to set up gang databases, they have fallen 
flat due to inconsistency, changing police priorities and weak manage-
ment structures. Moreover, the mechanistic ad-hoc manner in which 
the police have dealt with policing gangs has opened the door to the 
emergence of vigilante organisations. This will have further conse-
quences for both the police and the people they are meant to protect.
The research revealed that many police personnel were quite open 
about the roles they had played and the frustration they experienced. 
They spoke freely about aspects of police administration, police subcul-
ture, PAGAD and gangs. They all pointed to the failures rather than the 
successes of police action vis-à-vis gangs. All of the police interviewees 
identified corruption within police ranks as a critical factor as well as 
the politics of turf and competition between police units. Gangsters too 
were forthcoming on the issue of police problems. They listed police 
officers as being corrupt, taking side in gang wars and not respecting 
their profession. They also noted that the police were brutal in dealing 
with members of gangs. From this exploratory enquiry thus begins 
to emerge certain thematic issues relevant to the complex interaction 
between police and gangs which further research would do well to 
investigate more closely.
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